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I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization of business is an accepted fact, as is the growing
power of multinational corporations (MNCs).' A desire for peace also
seems to be globally accepted. 2 What is less certain is whether the
power of multinationals can be harnessed to help achieve peace.
Desire is not enough. Practical policies and procedures must be
implemented to help achieve this goal. Discussions of peace through
commerce mention certain preliminary conditions such as
establishing justice, good governance, transparency, and giving
individuals a voice as necessary requirements. 3 A tool increasingly
discussed and implemented to deliver and maintain these conditions
is whistleblowing.
Whistleblowing is a procedural way to reinforce the transparency
necessary to free trapped capital, 4 encourage foreign investment, and
move economies-especially transitional ones 5-away from reliance

1.
See generally DAVID C. KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD
(1995); Phillip M. Nichols, Regulating TransnationalBribery in Times of Globalization
and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 260-61 (1999) (calling economic and
commercial globalization "the most powerful force shaping the world as it enters the
twenty-first century" and citing political fragmentation, or decision-making at the local
level, as a complementary force); Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of
Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429 (1997).
2.
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 83-84 (1980); Timothy L.
Fort, CorporateMakahiki: The Governing Telos of Peace, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 301, 310-11
(2001).
3.
See, e.g., Responsible leadership in action, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: A
FINANCIAL TIMES GUIDE 13 (2000); Advertisement, Wouldn't it be better if we worked
together?, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: A FINANCIAL TIMES GUIDE 24 (2000) (advertising
that the heart of business practices of Norsk Hydro, a member of the PWBL Forum, are
openness, accountability, and honesty); Fort, supra note 2, at 309; Timothy L. Fort &
Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of the Corporation in Fostering Sustainable Peace, 35
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 393 (2002) [hereinafter Fort & Schipiani, Sustainable
Peace].
4.
Peter Wonacott, Chinese Corruption Has Sliced. Up to 16% Off GDP Over
Decade, Study Estimates, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2001, at A18. It can do this in two waysby reducing bribery and giving citizens a voice in their government. Fort & Schipani,
SustainablePeace, supra note 3, at 403.
5.
John Reed & Erik Portanger, Bribery, Corruption Are Rampant in Eastern
Europe, Survey Finds, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1999, at A21. The story reports on a survey
done by the World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Id.
It found that companies pay bribes that amount to as little as 2% of annual revenue in
The "bribery tax" fell especially hard on small
Croatia to 8% in Georgia. Id.
companies. Id.; David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption:A Principled
Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 593, 596
(2000) (noting that in the former Soviet Union, 60% of companies paid bribes compared
to 15% of businesses in industrial countries); Peter Eigen, The Transparency
InternationalBribe Payers Survey, at www.transparency.de/documents/cpi.bps.html;
Wonacott, supra note 4.
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on personal relationships and bribes. 6 To the extent that there is a
positive correlation between corruption, poverty, and violence, 7 the
need for whistleblowing is reinforced. Empowering individuals to
combat cronyism and call into question economic decisions made for
personal gain rather than the general good should allow more
resources to be allocated to those at the bottom of the economic scale.
Professors Fort and Schipani have persuasively argued that
corporations can have the greatest impact on peace through
mitigating internal-rather than international-conflicts; the way in
which corporations are governed makes a significant difference in the8
ethical values leading to mitigation of these conflicts.
Whistleblowing as a governance tool becomes even more important in
this context because it encourages responsive, and thereby
responsible, governance practices. It gives individuals a say in their
organization, and contributes to a feeling of procedural justice.
Giving individuals a standardized way to speak and be heard also
helps reinforce democratic ideas. This check on power is crucial for
an effective democratic institution. 9 Globalization often leads to a
feeling of disempowerment and creates conditions which allow the
few to benefit at the expense of the many. 10 Whistleblowing leads to
accountability, and accountability helps defuse the resentment 1 1 and
opportunities for corruption.
When whistleblowing is used to enforce just treatment norms,
inter-ethnic, inter-gender, and inter-religious interaction and notions
of equal treatment can be fostered. This is already true in the United

See, e.g., Hess & Dunfee, supra note 5, at 597-98, 606 (noting that secrecy is
6.
a defining characteristic of corruption); John Plender, Weeding out corruption, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2000, at 22; Lucinda A. Low & Katherine Cameron Atkinson, Led by
the U.S., the World Wages War on Corruption, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 3, 1997, at B9. The
Organization of American States, consisting of 34 Western nations, called for
transparency and financial disclosure to help combat bribery in its Inter-American
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
Convention Against Corruption.
Organization of American States, Third Plenary Session, Mar. 29, 1996, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html.
7.
Fort & Schipani, Sustainable Peace, supra note 3, at 397-98. The authors
cite the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, which ranks
countries by perceived level of corruption and the Heidelberg Index of Violence which
ranks conflicts by level of intensity. Id. Comparison of these indices indicates that the
countries with the least amount of corruption were involved in the least number of
violent conflicts; the most corrupt in the most violent conflicts. Id.
8.
Fort & Schipani, Sustainable Peace, supra note 3, at 393; see also Fort,
supra note 2, at 309.
9.
Fort & Schipani, Sustainable Peace, supra note 3, at 436.
10.
Id. at 33-34.
See, e.g., Don Clark, Security Experts Are on Alert Over Wireless Hacking
11.
Technique, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2001, at B7. The ability of an individual to wreak
havoc increases with the growing reliance on technology and electronic communication.
Id.
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States in terms of sexual harassment. 12 Such interaction1 3 and
14
enforced equality helps to defuse conflict.
The growing dominance of multinational corporations allows
them, in some respects, to act as independent states outside of the
effective control of particular countries. 15 Thus, it is appropriate to
consider the goals and restraints these multinationals impose on
themselves, as well as those that are externally imposed. 16 In the
United States, and to a lesser extent in other common law
countries, 17 companies are being encouraged, or even compelled, to
establish codes of conduct and whistleblowing procedures to enforce
them. This Article discusses whether these practices and goals can
be harnessed to help deliver on the promise of peace through
commerce.'

8

Part II of the Article examines the rationale for whistleblowing,
its growth in the United States, and the response to whistleblowing
in other countries. Part III examines the cultural dimensions of
whistleblowing and whether it is practical for multinational
organizations to adopt it as a governance tool. Adoption is found to
be feasible if appropriate reporting procedures and ethical norms are
adopted, and if allowances are made for some cultural adaptation.
Finally, the advantages of open reporting and communication
procedures to the corporation and the peace effort are discussed in
Part IV.

12.
See infra Part III.B.2.
13.
Fort & Schipani, Sustainable Peace, supra note 3, at 432 (arguing that
interaction creates personal relationships, which helps break through stereotypes).
14.
Fort, supra note 2, at 309. "Violence occurs in many forms in addition to
wars between natior states. Conflicts and grievances obviously arise when one person
or group feels that they have not been justly treated." Id.
15.
Clyde D. Stoltenberg, Globalization, 'Asian Values," and Economic Reform:
The Impact of Tradition and Change on Ethical Values in Chinese Business, 33
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 711, 712, 715 (2000); Jost Delbriick, Structural Changes in the
International System and its Legal Order: International Law in the Era of
Globalization,Swiss REV. INT'L & EUR. L. 34-35 (Jan. 2001).
16.
Alan Pike, An unrelenting pressure, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: A
FINANCIAL TIMES GUIDE 4 (2000). As noted by Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General,
this is a voluntary declaration of principles, not a legally binding compact. Carola
Hoyos, Principles of globalisation, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: A FINANCIAL TIMES
GUIDE 6 (2000); Fort, supra note 3, at 303. Contractarianism and communitarianism
share the premise that corporations will be primarily self-governing. Elletta Sangrey
Callahan et al., Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance:
Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and Employee
Empowerment, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 11 (forthcoming 2002).
17.
Hess & Dunfee, supra note 5, at 624-25. Many European MNCs also have
ethics officers and codes. This is in line with attempts to develop procedures for
corporate disclosure on social issues, auditing procedures, and the Global Reporting
Initiative. Id.
18.
Nichols, supra note 1, at 263.
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II.

THE GROWTH OF WHISTLEBLOWING

A. Why Whistleblowing?
The most commonly
accepted modern definition of
whistleblowing is "the disclosure by organization members (former or
current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control
of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to
effect action." 19 As indicated by this definition, it is seen today as an
employee action. This has not always been the case. For example,
the council of the city-state of Venice instituted whistleblowing to
help fight corruption and to give citizens a more meaningful voice in
their government. 20 The U.S. Congress, building on an idea adopted
from much earlier English legislation, passed a whistleblowing law as
a way to supplement governmental resources in fighting fraud during
the Civil War. 21 The recent emphasis on whistleblowing, however,
began with Ralph Nader's 1971 call for its implementation as a
means to stem organizational wrongdoing. 22 There are many reasons
why this is an idea whose time has come again.
Work organizations, both governmental and civil, are growing in
size and complexity, and individuals are often little more than "cogs"
in the organization in which they work. 23 Individual jobs have also
grown in complexity, and as a result have become more specialized
and expertise-based. 24 This, in turn, makes the detection of wrongful
conduct more difficult due to both lack of knowledge and access to

19.
MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 15 (1992);
Terance D. Miethe & Joyce Rothschild, Whistleblowing and the Control of
OrganizationalMisconduct, 64 SOC. INQUIRY 322, 323 (1994).
20.
SUSIE BOULTON & CHRISTOPHER CATLING, VENICE & THE VENETO 88-89
(2001). In the Sala della Bussola in the Doge's Palace, for example, there is a "bocca de
leone" or lion's mouth. Id. The lion's mouth has a slit through which citizens could slip
secret denunciations. Id. Catching tax evaders was one goal; another was state
security. Id.
21.
Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 6, 12 Stat. 696; False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-33 (1988) (formerly the False Claims Act of March 2, 1863, 31 U.S.C. §§ 372933 (1988). The objective of the Act was to punish government contractors who were,
among other things, selling sawdust for gunpowder. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry
Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing
and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 302 n.112 (1992) [hereinafter Callahan
& Terry, Do Good].
22.
Ralph Nader, Editorial, A Code for Professional Integrity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 1971, at 43.
23.
Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global
Environment: The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829,
837 (2000) [hereinafter Fort & Schipiani, Corporate Governance]; Miethe & Rothschild,
supra note 19, at 328.
24.
Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 19, at 328. They have also become more
professionalized. Id.
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information. 2 5 At the same time, the information and technology
revolutions have increased the opportunities for significant fraud and
other harmful and illegal activities. 26 Whistleblowing is one way to
over the large organizations that
obtain-or regain-societal control
27
society.
dominate
increasingly
The premise behind recent governmental promotion of
whistleblowing is that people of conscience work within these large,
complex organizations, and would normally take action against
wrongdoing except for fear of losing their jobs or other forms of
retaliation. 28 Thus, if adequately protected from retaliation, they will
come forward with evidence of wrongdoing before external detection
is possible. Harms from the wrongdoing could be reduced, wrongful
behavior stopped, and the expense of public oversight and
29
Also, if
investigation would be reduced if such reporting occurs.
whistleblowing proved a relatively common occurrence, wrongdoing
would decrease because potential wrongdoers would be aware that
their activities were not truly secret.
B. The U.S. Experience
While initially discussed in the early 1970s, it took significant
disasters such as the explosion of the Challenger, 30 mass accidental
32
31
poisoning of food, and publicity about extensive contractor fraud
for whistleblowing to become a common tool of control. All three
branches of government, at both the federal and state levels, now

Id.
25.
Id.; Fort & Schipani, SustainablePeace, supra note 3, at 413.
26.
George C.S. Benson, Codes of Ethics and Whistleblowing, in
27.
WHISTLEBLOWING-SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? 53 (Gerald Vinten ed.,
1994). U.S. efforts to obtain or regain societal control over business organizations date
back to the Industrial Revolution. Id.
Janet P. Near et al., Explaining the Whistleblowing Process: Suggestions
28.
from Power Theory and Justice Theory, 4 ORG. Sci. 393 (1993).
Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal
29.
Whistleblowing: Protectingthe Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society,
29 AM. Bus. L.J. 266, 305 (1991).
See, e.g., Laura McGinley, NASA to Probe Transfer of Engineers At Thiokol
30.
After Damaging Testimony, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1986, at A4.
Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are
31.
The first state to pass a
They Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 243 (1987).
whistleblowing statute, Michigan, did so after a poisonous fire retardant was
mistakenly shipped to feed grain cooperatives instead of the intended nutritional
supplement. Id. Farmers lost millions of dollars, and residents suffered serious health
effects, some of which could have been avoided if employees had come forward. Id. at
244-45. They testified they did not because they had been warned they would lose
their jobs if they did so. Id. at 245.
Callahan & Dworkin, Do Good, supra note 21, at 303.
32.
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33
have adopted measures designed to encourage whistleblowing.
While all measures protect the reporter from retaliation, other
provisions vary considerably on issues 34 such as to whom the whistle
36
should be blown, 3 5 whether motive should be considered, whether
37
the whistleblower may benefit from reporting, what standard of
evidence of wrongdoing should be required, 38 and what 39remedy
should be provided to a whistleblower who suffers retaliation.
As public policy supporting whistleblowing has matured, there
has been a shift toward encouraging internal whistleblowing and
away from the almost exclusive legislative emphasis on reporting
outside the organization. This represents a change in emphasis away
from a primary focus on punishment by governmental bodies toward
earlier and more complete cessation of wrongdoing. 40 It also saves
public funds. There are many other advantages to internal reporting.
It accords with the actions of most whistleblowers, 41 is less harmful to
the organization and the employee, 42 and is considered more
ethical. 43 A variety of laws and decisions both directly and indirectly
have caused employers to establish internal whistleblowing
procedures in order to reap the benefits that these reports can
44
deliver.

Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State
33.
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 100 (2000) [hereinafter Callahan &
Dworkin, The State].
Other issues not addressed in the text include sanctions by some states
34.
against the individuals who retaliate against whistleblowers, whether the report of
wrongdoing must be in writing and what the appropriate statute of limitations should
be. MICELI & NEAR, supra note 19, at 232-73 (1992).
Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 29, at 268.
35.
36.
See generally Callahan & Dworkin, Do Good, supra note 21, at 318-25.
Id. at 280-83. There is more uniformity at the federal level, where
37.
legislators show less concern about motive and the identity of the report recipient and
are more willing to allow significant financial rewards for useful information. Id. at
278-83.
38.
MICELI & NEAR, supra note 19, at 137-38.
Id. at 236-37; see also Dworkin & Near, supra note 31, at 260-64.
39.
Callahan & Dworkin, Do Good, supra note 21, at 306.
40.
MICELI & NEAR, supra note 19, at 26.
41.
42.
Near et al., supra note 28, at 399. Studies of whistleblowers indicate that
the best predictor of retaliation is external whistleblowing. Id.
SISSELA BOK, SECRETS 221 (1989) (citing internal whistleblowing as more
43.
ethical if it is feasible, because sounding the loudest alarm first by reporting outside
the organization is an act of disloyalty to colleagues and employees). If a problem can
be solved internally, the destructive side-effects of external reporting can be avoided.

Id.
Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 29, at 305-08 (discussing more thoroughly
44.
the benefits).
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The most important direct cause of organizational establishment
of internal whistleblowing procedures 45 is the Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines. 46
The Guidelines, which determine penalties for
corporations convicted of federal crimes, 47 take a "carrot and stick"
approach toward curbing organizational wrongdoing.
Convicted
organizations that have made little or no effort to prevent or reduce
wrongdoing suffer increased monetary penalties 48 and sanctions,
including probation, 49 and mandated negative publicity. 50 Reduced
fines and avoidance of sanctions are provided for organizations that,
in good faith, have attempted to stop and detect misconduct. 51 A
written code of ethics, a meaningful reporting system,5 2 and
protection of whistleblowers from reprisals are key characteristics of
an acceptable deterrence and detection program that will qualify for
reduced fines and sanctions.
The Supreme Court has also prompted organizations to establish
codes and internal reporting procedures through its hostile
environment sexual harassment decisions. 53 Most organizations,
however, have established these procedures for the limited purpose of
controlling harassment and not for the reporting of other kinds of

45.
Janet P. Near & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Responses to Legislative
Changes: Corporate Whistleblowing Policies, 17 J. Bus. ETHICS 1551, 1560 (1998);
Christopher Conte, Labor Letter, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1991, at Al.
46.
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational
Defendants, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,786, 22,786-97 (May 16, 1991) [hereinafter Sentencing
Guidelines].
47.
Id. at 22,787. The Sentencing Reform Act, passed in 1984, established the
Sentencing Commission. Id. The Commission, under a mandate to reduce disparities
and judicial discretion in sentences, promulgated the Guidelines.
Id.
After
establishing guidelines for individual felons, the Commission established the Corporate
Sentencing Guidelines. Id.; see also Near & Dworkin, supra note 45, at 1551.
48.
Penalties assessed in a given case depend on a "culpability score" which
increases the multiplier for factors such as involvement of high-level corporate officers
in the crime, or previous convictions for the same crime. Sentencing Guidelines, 56
Fed. Reg. at 22,787.
49.
Id. at 22,791. A convicted organization with fifty or more employees that
does not have an effective compliance program is to be put on probation and ordered to
put such a program in place. Id.
50.
Id.; Andrew Cowan, Note, Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punishment by
Publicity under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2387 (1992). Other
penalties include fines that are sufficiently large to divest the organization of its net
assets. Sentencing Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. at 22,789.
51.
Sentencing Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. at 22,789-91; Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines Focus Attention on CorporateCompliance, 62 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 195, 196 (Feb. 13, 1992).
52.
Sentencing Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. at 22,793. The Guidelines specifically
mention hotlines as an acceptable internal reporting mechanism. Additionally, to
qualify for the reduced penalties, the organization is supposed to report the wrongdoing
discovered through the internal reporting procedure to the government or cooperate
with the government. Id.
53.
See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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wrongdoing. 54 In these decisions the Court recognized an employer
defense to hostile environment sexual harassment suits for firms that
make reasonable efforts to prevent and correct harassment. 5 5 An
effective complaint procedure is a central element of such a
This defense is also applicable in cases claiming
program.5 6
harassment on such bases as religion, race, national origin, and
57
disability.
Revisions to the False Claims Act (FCA)58 have also spurred the
establishment of intra-firm reporting frameworks. 59 While the Act
itself encourages external reporting through filing lawsuits in the
government's name, the extraordinarily large whistleblowers' awards,
fines, and recoveries paid to the federal government, and the
dramatic increase in FCA whistleblowing, have led many
organizations, especially those in the defense and healthcare
Under the FCA, whistleblowers who
industries, to self-police. 60
successfully prosecute FCA claims against those who have
fraudulently claimed federal funds receive up to thirty percent of
recovered monies. 61 Because of the amount of fraud, treble damages,
and fines as high as ten thousand dollars per false claim, the average
recovery for a successful FCA whistleblower is over one million
dollars. 62 The government recovered over three billion dollars

Earlier decisions and political events such as the Clarence Thomas
54.
Supreme Court confirmation hearings also resulted in many large businesses
establishing harassment reporting procedures. Terry Moorhead Dworkin & Ellen R.
Peirce, Is Religious Harassment"More Equal",26 SETON HALL L. REV. 44, 63 (1995).
The defense requires the employer to prove that it exercised reasonable
55.
care to prevent and correct sexually harassing behavior and that the employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of employer-provided corrective measures.
Faragher,524 U.S. at 775; BurlingtonIndus., 524 U.S. at 744.
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 3 (2000) (providing that the
56.
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination has the authority to advise
employers on employment and sexual harassment issues); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-51-2
(2001) (encouraging employers to conduct education and training programs on sexual
harassment). In several states the requirement that employers provide education on
sexual harassment, including information regarding internal reporting procedures, is
imposed by statute.
Debbie M Kaminer, When Religious Expression Creates a Hostile Work
57.
Environment: The Challenge of Balancing Competing FundamentalRights, 4 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 81 (2000); Dworkin & Peirce, supra note 54, at 76; Harassment
Rulings Reinforce Need for Policies and Procedures, Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 76
(June 21, 2001) (discussing disability harassment).
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1988). See supra Part I for mention of this Civil War58.
era law.
59.
Charles Pereyra-Suarez & Carole A. Klove, Ring Around the White Collar:
Defending Fraudand Abuse, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 31, 36-37 (1996).
Callahan & Dworkin, The State, supra note 33, at 101.
60.
If the government joins the suit, the
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (1988).
61.
whistleblower gets up to 25% of the recovery. The government has joined in about 15%
of these suits. Id.; see also Callahan & Dworkin, The State, supra note 33, at 101 n.9.
Qui Tam Statistics, 12 FALSE CLAIMS ACT & Qui TAm Q. REV. 41 (1998).
62.
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between 1986, when the law was revised, and 1999.63 FCA suits
increased from an average of six per year to approximately two per

day in 1999.64
The widespread judicial adoption of a tort-based theory of

wrongful firing in violation of public policy provides a similar indirect

incentive for companies to provide internal reporting channels.6 5 In
many states, courts have specifically recognized this theory in
whistleblowing cases.66 Because employers who use their power to
subvert public policy are usually perceived as especially wrongful,
recoveries in these cases commonly include punitive damages and are
67
quite large.

This discussion of incentives is not exclusive. 68 Decisions such as
In re Caremark International, Inc.,69 suggesting that the failure to
have a code of ethics may be tantamount to a violation of
management's fiduciary duty to shareholders, as well as pressure
from NGOs, 70 have spurred organizations to examine their ethical
stances and systems. 7 ' Whatever the incentive, it is clear that most

63.
FCA News: Qui Tam Actions Return over $3 Billion to Federal Treasury, 18
FALSE CLAIMS ACT & Qui TAM Q. REV. 17-18 (2000). Representative Howard Berman,
a main sponsor of the 1986 FCA amendments, stated another three billion dollars more
was expected to be recovered from pending litigation. Peter Aranson, Critics Gripe at
Suits Claiming U.S. is Cheated Out of Billions, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 9, 1999, at Al.
Aranson, supra note 63 (quoting prosecutor Joyce Branda). There are
64.
many other statutes that give rewards for whistleblowing, but none give the
whistleblower as significant or sure an award. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Symposium,
Innovations in Environmental Policy: The Continuing Innovation of Citizen
Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 226 (discussing awards for information leading
to convictions for environmental crimes); Callahan & Dworkin, Do Good, supra note 21,
at 278-83.
See generally Callahan & Dworkin, Do Good, supranote 21, at 285-95.
65.
66.
See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark. 1988);
Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 257 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc). For a complete list,
see Callahan & Dworkin, The State, supra note 33, at app. 132-75.
See, e.g., Paraclesus Health Care Corp. v. Willard, 754 So.2d 437 (Miss.
67.
1999); Verdicts & Settlements, NAT'L L.J., June 26, 2000, at A16.
68.
See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1989), amended by
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (1989); FREDERICK ELLISTON ET
AL., WHISTLEBLOWING 16-19 (1985) (explaining reporting procedures established by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission); Jamie R. Welton, In the Wake of the Columbia/HCA
Investigations: Plotting a Course for Medicare Compliance, 7 ELDER L.J. 217, 247
(1999) (discussing the risks of Medicare noncompliance).
69.
In re Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
70.
NGOs, or non-governmental organizations, are comprised of international
charities, aid agencies, and other pressure groups, and are growing in number and
influence. Alan Pike, Confronting the critics, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: A FINANCIAL
TIMES GUIDE 17 (2000).
71.
John Plender, Unpopular Capitalism, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000, at 24
(citing the Seattle riots, Greenpeace, and the presidential campaigns of Gore and
Nader, among other factors); David Greising, Shades of Seattle Riot as Clinton
Addresses Elite Economic Forum, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2000, at C13 (citing Davos
protests).
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large U.S.-based organizations, including MNCs, now have some form
of reporting procedure.
C. Whistleblowing in Other Countries
While whistleblowing as a control mechanism is most pervasive
in the United States, it has been adopted or is being considered in
many other countries. This development is most pronounced in
countries with a common law tradition. Promotion of whistleblowing
in these countries reflects the U.S. experience.7 2 Initially, there is
great reluctance to embrace whistleblowing. A precipitating scandal,
which receives widespread publicity and involves insider knowledge
of the problem, is usually the motivating factor that causes a country
to move from denial to consideration or passage of legislation. It is
assumed that knowledgeable insiders could have prevented the
problem had their information reached the proper ears. It is also
assumed or stated that, had the insiders been protected from
retaliation, the information would have been appropriately conveyed.
In the United Kingdom, for example, legislation was spurred by
well-publicized, often tragic events such as the "Lyme Regis canoe
case," in which four children drowned because of inadequate safety
equipment and training at a recreational facility. 73 After several
years of consideration, the Public Interest Disclosure Act was enacted
by Parliament in 1998. 74 The law shows a strong preference for
75
internal whistleblowing.

72.
See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (asserting that other
countries have a common experience when adopting this mechanism).
See, e.g., Gary Slapper, Will these deaths be avenged?, TIMES (London), Mar.
73.
5, 1996; at 37 (acknowledging the progress made in prosecuting him for manslaughter).
This case was one of four featured on a program aired in January 1996, on BBC
Channel 4, highlighting the retaliation against whistleblowers in Britain. In the Lyme
Regis case, an employee had written a letter to her employer about safety problems and
was dismissed. She made her letter public after the deaths. Id.
In another case that garnered much attention, 18,000 elderly investors lost their
savings and taxpayers incurred a £150 million expense after the collapse of an
investment firm. Id. Again, there was a noted failure of whistleblowing. Id. The
official inquiry into the crash of the firm, Barlow-Clowes, noted that some of the
employees must have known that they were engaging in something improper. Id.
However, the inspectors also noted that, "the position of the 'whistle-blower' is
frequently extremely uncomfortable. The most likely result of such 'whistle-blowing'
would be an immediate-if wrongful-termination of employment." Don Touhig, How
to protect whistle-blowers, SUN. TIMES (London), Feb. 25, 1996, at News Review 4.
74.
Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, c. 23 (U.K.), available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980023.htm. The Public Interest Disclosure
Act amended the Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/1996018.htm.
75.
Whistleblowers are protected under the Act if they make a "qualifying
disclosure." Public Interest Disclosure Act § (adding new section 43B to the Employee
Rights Act). A qualifying disclosure is made "if the worker makes the disclosure in
good faith-(a) to his employer" or someone designated by the employer. Id. (adding
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Whistleblowing legislation introduced in New Zealand 76 followed
77
a scant four months after a well-publicized incident there.
Australian statutes followed well-publicized retaliation against
78
whistleblowers as well.

As in the U.S. legislation, all these laws protect the
whistleblower from retaliation, but they vary in most other respects,
including the kind of information about which protected disclosures
can be made, the evidence of wrongdoing required, the motive for the
whistleblowing, whether the whistleblower can benefit from the
disclosure, and the report recipient. 79 While the details vary, it is
clear that the idea of whistleblowing as an organizational control
mechanism is spreading through common law countries.8 0
Legislative spurs for organizations to establish internal reporting
mechanism are not yet as powerful as in the United States. As in the
United States, though, the idea of promoting internal whistleblowing
is also being established through rules about sexual harassment. 81
There has been greater reluctance to adopt whistleblowing in
other countries for reasons that are discussed below. While EC
countries other than the United Kingdom have not embraced
whistleblowing, they were made aware of it and the need for
protection of whistleblowers through the case of Stanley Adams.
Adams, a senior executive at the Swiss company Hoffman-La Roche,
reported the company's anti-competitive conduct to the EEC

new sections 43C(1)(a) and 43C(2) to the Employee Rights Act). The worker is allowed
to go outside the employer to report, if it is reasonably necessary. Id. (adding new
section 43G(2) to the Employee Rights Act).
76.
Protected Disclosure Act, 2000 (N.Z.), available at http://www.ombudsmen.
govt.nz/protecte.htm.
77.
Catherine Weber, Whistleblowing and the Whistleblowers Protection Bill
1994, 7 AUKLAND U. L. REV. 933, 935-37 (1995).
78.
Protected Disclosures Act, No. 92, N.S.W. ACTS (N.S.W. 1994);
Whistleblowers Protection Act, No. 21, S. Austl. Acts & Ord. (S. Austl. 1993); Robert
Baxt, The public interest or improper use of inforination-thedilemma for the insider
environmental whistleblower, 24 AuSTL. Bus. L. REV., 319, 322 nn.2, 3 (1996); Richard
Evans, When honesty doesn't pay, 68 LAW INST. J. 459 (1994). A commission was
appointed in 1993 to examine the form that federal legislation should take, and
whistleblowing legislation had been debated even earlier. David Lewis, Employment
Protection for Whistleblowers: On What Principles Should Australian Legislation Be
Based, 9 AUSTL. J. LAB. L. 135, 135-36 (1996). See also Public Service Act, 1999, c. 16,
§ 16 (Austl.).
79.
Terry Morehead Dworkin, Models of Whistleblowing in the International
Environment 4-12 (2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Author).
80.
Ireland and Canada have also considered whistleblowing legislation. See
Jane Baker Jones, Whistleblowing: No longer out of tune, AUSTL. AcCT., Aug. 1996, at
56; A & L Goodbody, Irish Law Newsletter, Pension Trustee-As "Whistleblower" and
Other Developments, BUS. MONITOR, Feb. 1, 1996.
81.
See, e.g., Sex Discrimination Act, 1984, 20 F.C.R. 217 (Austl.). Additionally,
companies operating in the United States are likely to have reporting procedures in
those operations, even though they may not have them in their operations outside the
United States.
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Commission for Competition. 82 Switzerland signed the Free Trade
Agreement with the EC in 1972, and Adams assumed his disclosure
would be protected under this agreement. 83 Adams asked the
Commission to keep his identity confidential, and the Commission did
not begin investigations until after Adams resigned and moved to
Italy.8 4 During the investigation, Adams' identity was inadvertently
revealed to his former employer, which had him arrested when he
returned to Switzerland. 85 He was held incommunicado for three
months. 86
Adams' Italian business ventures failed, his wife
87
committed suicide,. and he was found guilty of economic espionage.
He was later imprisoned in Italy after the failure of his businesses
there.
Hoffman-La Roche was found guilty of anti-competitive
activities."8 This case received wide publicity, and the European
-Parliament adopted a resolution instructing its Legal Affairs
Committee to consider the implications of the case.8 9 However, no
protective legislation resulted.9 0
Whistleblowing in the EC has also been considered in response
to the amount of fraud that has been discovered. 91 Initially discussed

82.
Neville March Hunnings, The Stanley Adams Affair or The Bitter Bit, 24
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 65, 71 (1987).
83.
Id. at 70-71.
84.
YVONNE CRipps, THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DISCLOSURE IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 13 (2d ed. 1994).
85.
Hoffman-La Roche instituted proceedings in Switzerland for the theft of its
documents when it learned that the European Community had received information
contained in the company's documents. Adams was arrested on charges of economic
espionage in violation of Section 273 of the Swiss Penal Code. Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Hunnings, supra note 82, at 73.
88.
The company was found guilty of violating Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome
because it abused its dominant position in the vitamin market. CRIPPS, supra note 84,
at 13. The company was fined the equivalent of £180,000. This was reduced by onethird on appeal. Id.
89.
Id. at 14.
90.
As a result of the report to the European Parliament, the Parliament
requested that the Commission of the European Community make a payment to
Adams to compensate him for the psychological and physical consequences of his
whistleblowing. Id. He was paid £25,000, which was less than his expenses. Id. He
appealed his claim for damages to the European Court of Justice, and was partially
successful. Id. The court found in his favor, but allowed only half the damages claimed
as they found Adams to be partially responsible for his damages, because he did not
inform the Commission that it was possible to infer his identity from the documents
that were handed over to Hoffman-La Roche, he did not ask to be kept informed about
the progress of the investigation, and he returned to Switzerland without investigating
the progress of the investigation. Id. The Parliament also asked the Commission to
give the Legal Affairs Committee an assurance that, in the future, people who revealed
information of activities that were contrary to the EEC-Switzerland trade agreement
would not be prosecuted in the Swiss courts. Id.
91.
Michael Dynes, EU told to protect 'fraud busters, TIMES (London), June 2,
1995, at Overseas News. The amount of detected fraud in 1994 exceeded £816 million,
and this was estimated to be only the "tip of the iceberg." Id.
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in the early 1990s, it arose again several years later when Paul van
Buitenen blew the whistle on the Commission's failure to deal with
fraud.9 2 Although his coming forward eventually led to the mass
resignation of the Commission and several changes of control within
the bureaucracy, no measures were adopted to protect whistleblowers
93
who, like van Buitenen, suffered retaliation.

III.

CAN WHISTLEBLOWING BE GLOBALLY APPLIED?

The initial question posed by this Article is whether the
increasing adoption by MNCs of codes of ethics and whistleblowing
procedures could be harnessed to help deliver on the promise of peace
through commerce. The impact of these mechanisms will be greatly
limited if they can only be applied when companies operate in
common law countries. As the Adams and van Buitenen cases
illustrate, there is still great reluctance to embrace whistleblowing
procedures. This, then, raises the question of whether it is practical
or ethical for MNCs to try to enforce such procedures regardless of
where they operate. This Article answers yes, despite the varying
cultural norms involved.
A. The Cultural Dimension
The reluctance to consider or encourage whistleblowing has a
definite cultural component that varies by country. As discussed
above, modern, non-political 94 whistleblowing is a Western
phenomenon. The countries that have adopted it have common lawbased legal systems and societies that prizes individualism. While
"snitching" is not generally condoned, the idea of citizen law
enforcement has long roots in the United Kingdom and the United
States, and whistleblowing has been advocated as a way to control
In some Western
large organizations for over thirty years. 95
countries such as France, Greece, and Luxembourg, however,

92.
Neil Buckley, Europe: Kinnock ushers in cultural revolution, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 2000, at 7.
93.
Avenue of the Americas: Lucky Guy, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2000, at 11. While
van Buitenen has not retained his position, he has received several awards for his
whistleblowing, including being named "European of the Year" by Reader's Digest. Id.
He received $10,000 in prize money and intended to put it into a fund to help other
whistleblowers around Europe. Id.
BOK, supra note 43, at 213 (distinguishing legitimate whistleblowing from
94.
government-endorsed reporting for ideological or religious persecution purposes).
95.
But see George C. Benson, Codes of ethics and whistleblowing, 7
MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 37, 39 (1992) (citing Peter Drucker, analogizing
whistleblowing to "informer systems set up by monarch dictators"). Benson supports
internal whistleblowing. Id.
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whistleblowing is seen as little different from informing the
government about a neighbor's dissident views. This, in turn, is
frowned on at least in part because it is considered an attribute of
totalitarian or Communist states. 96 In Germany,9 7 whistleblowing is
thought unnecessary because of moral superiority.
The idea of reporting the wrongdoing of one's group is alien to
many other cultures in which group membership rather than
individualism is the norm. In Japan, for example, the traditions of
consensus, company mentality, and lifetime employment make
whistleblowing almost unheard of and highly risky. 98 One employee
who defied this tradition, an ex-Honda engineer who allegedly quit in
a dispute over safety issues, is now a plaintiffs expert witness in the
United States in suits against Honda. 99 His testimony provides an
income that he could no longer earn in Japan because of his
dissent.100

An explanation for these differences can be drawn from several
studies that show basic differences in value systems between national
cultures.10 1 The differences can be described in several ways, but one

See Dynes, supra note 91.
96.
Peter Norman, Comment & Analysis, A hidden hand of corruption, FIN.
97.
TIMES, June 5, 1996, at 27. Norman discusses a cultural denial of corruption and
financial malpractice in Germany, despite clear evidence to the contrary including
fraud surveys conducted by KPMG in eighteen countries and statements from officials.
Id. Wolfgang Schaupensteiner, Frankfurt's top anticorruption prosecutor, called the
corruption in the building industry in terms of bribes paid to government officials for
public works contracts as being on a "Sicilian scale." Id. The Deputy Director of the
Christian Democratic Union in the Bundestag stated, "[A] few years ago [corruption]
He also stated that, "[s]een
Id.
was almost a foreign word in Germany."
internationally, I am convinced that we still have relatively healthy structures." Id.
When the Author discussed the idea of whistleblowing with lawyers and law
professors in Germany in 1996, no one had heard of the idea, and their reaction was
that it was a peculiar idea, at best; the more common reaction was that it was bizarre,
destructive, and unnecessary.
Benjamin Weiser, An Ex-Employee As Hostile Witness: Honda Faces
98.
Unusual Critic, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 6, 1996. Whistleblowing is "very much out of
character and rare" in Japan. Id. (quoting Professor Daniel Foote of the University of
Washington School of Law). Professor Setsuo Miyzawa of Kobe University is quoted as
saying, "A whistleblower would become 'a marked man."' Id.; see also Valerie Reitman
& Michael Schuman, Men's Club: Japanese and Korean Companies Rarely Look
Outside For People to Run Their Overseas Operations;Some Think Its Time To Change,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1996, at R17. "[T]he likely reaction of a Japanese worker who
stumbles on alleged wrongdoing would be to protect his company's image and
reputation, to save face at any cost." Id.
Id.
99.
"In America, 'the squeaky wheel gets the grease."' In Japan, "the nail that
100.
stands out gets pounded down." Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and

the Self.- Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REV. 224,
224 (1991). These sayings exemplify the differences in the acceptance of dissent in the
United States and Japan.
See, e.g., ALFONSO TROMPENAARS, RIDING THE WAVES OF CULTURE:
101.
UNDERSTANDING DIVERSITY IN GLOBAL BUSINESS (1994); GERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S
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which incorporates dimensions relevant to whistleblowing is that
proposed by Hofstede.1 0 2 He identifies five dimensions on which
cultures vary: power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance,
These dimensions
masculinity, and Confucian dynamism. 10 3
influence ethical decision-making and, in turn, affect support for
whistleblowing. Of these five, power distance, individualism, and
Confucian dynamism are most relevant to examining whistleblowing
among cultures. Cultures with a high power distance are more
willing to accept that power is unequally distributed among
individuals and are therefore more willing to accept inequality,

autocratic leadership, and centralization of authority. 10 4 Cultures
high in individualism have a loosely-knit social framework in which

people believe they are responsible for themselves and their
immediate family instead of believing that they are members of an ingroup which will look out for them. 10 5 A society which scores high in
Confucian dynamism is a dynamic, future-oriented society, while a
society low in this dimension tends to be tradition-bound and
static.

10 6

These classifications are, of course, only tools of analysis, and
10 7
countries may vary along a continuum in each dimension.
Nonetheless, they may help explain why the United States, Australia,
and the United Kingdom are some of the first countries with
whistleblower legislation, and other countries are more reluctant to
accept the idea. Japan is a low-scoring country on individualism,
relatively low-scoring on dynamism, and high-scoring on power
distance.' 0 8
People living in a low individualistic, high power
distance country are less likely to challenge authority, and those in

CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK RELATED VALUES (1980); see

also Markus & Kitayama, supra note 100, at 224; David Vogel, Business Ethics: New
Perspectiveson Old Problems, 33 CAL. MGMT. REV. 101 (1991).
102.
See generally GERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL
DIFFERENCES IN WORK RELATED VALUES (abridged ed. 1984).

103.
Id.
104.
Id. at 65-109.
105.
Id. at 148-75.
Stoltenberg, supra note 15, at 719 (describing the influences of the
106.
Confucian theory on a corporation). "'[T]he practice of civility and mutual respect'
encouraged by Confucian teaching was commonly regarded as a 'humane' and superior
alternative to the enforcement of laws on 'unwilling or recalcitrant subjects."' Id. at
721.
107.
There are also individual variations within a culture. Markus & Kitayama,
supra note 100, at 226.
108.
See id. at 227 (discussing non-Western views, especially Japanese, of the
self as part of an encompassing social relationship in which, "one's behavior is
determined, contingent on, and, to a large extent organized by what the actor perceives
to be the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others in the relationship."). This contrasts
with a Western view of the self, "whose behavior is organized and made meaningful
primarily by reference to one's own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and
action...." Id. at 226.
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authority are less likely to tolerate challenges. Additionally, loyalty
to the group will be stronger in this climate, thus making reporting
on someone within the group less likely. 10 9 Finally, going against
societal norms to blow the whistle is less likely in a low-dynamic
society.
The United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, by
contrast, are countries which score at the high end on the
individualism and dynamism dimensions, and low on power
distance. 110
Thus, people in these societies are more likely to
challenge authority, and doing so is more likely to be socially
acceptable. Even if it is frowned upon, people are more likely to do so
if they, as individuals, feel it is the right thing to do.
This analysis does not imply that whistleblowing procedures
cannot be successfully implemented in countries like Japan. 1 1' It
does indicate that it will be more difficult, and MNCs will have to
carefully consider and structure what they ask their employees to do
if internal reporting is to be used as an ethical control mechanism.
This may be easier now than it would have been even a decade ago for
two reasons. First, the societies studied are dynamic. 112 Japan, for
example, is slowly moving away from life-time employment as its
economy worsens, and independent thinking and challenges to
authority are becoming more common. 113 Second, whistleblowing is

109.

This is because the society will be more collectivist in nature. See generally

Joseph Sanders et al., The Institutionalization of Sanctions for Wrongdoing inside
Organizations:Public Judgments in Japan, Russia, and the United States, 32 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 871 (1998) (discussing, in part, collectivist views and the view of sanctions
in Moscow, Tokyo, and Washington). One finding was that the Japanese were more
likely to think that individuals should apologize and resign rather than have sanctions
imposed against the organization. Id.
110.
HOFSTEDE, supra note 101, at 269.
111.
Markus & Kitayama, supra note 100, at 225, 228 (stating that non-Western
attributes also apply to countries like China, with its Confucian emphasis on
interrelatedness and kindness, and Latin America, Africa, and certain Southern
European cultures).
112.
Stoltenberg, supra note 15, at 9 (regarding China); Philip M. Nichols, The

Viability of Transplanted Law: Kazakhstani Reception of a Transplanted Foreign
Investment Code, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1235, 1275-79 (1997) (discussing how
Western laws can change society due to the dynamic relationship between culture and
law).
113.
See, e.g., Peter Landers, The Mighty Pen, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2001, at R5;
Yumiko Ono, Ask the Iconoclast: To Understand Itself, Japan Calls a Novelist, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 23, 2001, at Al; Japanese business ethics: Blow whistles while you work,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2001, at 68; Peter Landers, Teed Up: Unbuilt Golf Course Land
Japanese Firm In Fight Over Secrecy, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2000, at Al (describing a
court and publicity battle by a top executive of Mitsukoshi Ltd., Japan's most
prestigious department store chain, to obtain information about the company spending
$550 million to buy land for a golf course in the 1980s that it never built; the deal was
kept secret from him and others, and he was ordered to resign when he tried to find out
about it); Gillian Tett, Japan'sethical clampdown puts golf out of bounds, FIN. TIMES,
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increasingly being discussed and considered on an international
scale, so it is not as radical an idea as it once may have appeared.
South Korea, a country that lies along the same dimensions as Japan
on Hofstede's scale, is considering whistleblowing legislation as part
114
of its anti-corruption efforts.
B. How to Overcome These Differences
For companies to implement successfully global ethical codes and
internal reporting procedures, especially in countries that have yet to
embrace whistleblowing, three things are essential. First, reporting
procedures must be clear, easy to access, and strongly supported by
top management. Second, ethical norms should concern relatively
few issues which can garner wide acceptance or understanding.
Finally, allowances must be made for some cultural adaptation.
1. Reporting Procedures
A large number of studies have been conducted on
whistleblowers, particularly on what distinguishes observers of
wrongdoing who blow the whistle from those who do not. 115 The most
important predictor is whether there is a clear reporting procedure
that is seen as effective. 116 Fear of retaliation and protection from
retaliation do not seem to play as significant a role. 117 Additionally,
to help overcome the reluctance of employees to report wrongdoing,
especially where it is counter-cultural, the organization must
convince employees that adherence to its principles and procedures is
for the common good of the organization.
In terms of micro-level theories of deviance, whistleblowing
needs to be seen as normative behavior rather than deviant behavior.
In situations where great emphasis is placed on organizational
conformity and loyalty to co-workers and the organization, the
organization must convince employees that whistleblowing is

May 19, 2000, at 20 (describing new rules for bureaucrats instituted to help combat
corruption).
114.
See generally HEUNGSIK PARK, THE LOGIC OF WHISTLEBLOWING (1999).
Professor Park has been the Associate Director of the Whistleblower Protection Center
(The Chamyeoyeondai) since 1994.
115.
Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the
Whistle to the Media and Why: OrganizationalCharacteristicsof Media Whistleblowers,
32 AM. Bus. L.J. 151, 163 n.73 (1994) (citing studies) [hereinafter Callahan & Dworkin,
Media Whistleblowers]; MICELI & NEAR, supra note 19, at 148-52 (and studies cited
therein); Near et al., supra note 28, at 398-99.
116.
Near et al., supra note 28, at 398-99; Callahan & Dworkin, Media
Whistleblowers, supra note 115, at 178; MICELI & NEAR, supra note 19, at 127-28.
117.
Dworkin & Near, supra note 31, at 261.
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Social learning theory can also help
normative and desired." 8
explain how whistleblowing can be seen as normal rather than
deviant. Learning takes place through interaction with significant
If organizational leaders, co-workers, or society view
others.
whistleblowing as appropriate, then whistleblowing will be seen as
normal and should increase." 9 Even if viewed as deviant within a
group, support from important external constituents can give 12a0
person sufficient rationalization to engage in whistleblowing.
Reporting requirements, if implemented and seriously followed, will
help achieve this "normative" behavior.
To have an effective compliance program an organization should:
. Establish a written compliance program. Written compliance
programs should be clearly written, easily understood, relatively
brief, and lack legal verbiage. To the extent feasible, employees
from all sectors of the organization should participate in the
formation of the requirements. This has two benefits: greater
a greater
investment in the program from the employees and
12 1
probability that the code will respond to real issues.
. Train employees regarding compliance. Training should be
done in a way that engages the employees and causes them to
think about what is required. 122 Policies should stress that
123
employees can be held personally liable for failure to comply
and that the organization may be legally liable for compliance
failure. 124 Corporations should stress that non-retaliation is an
integral part of the policy.
. Establish a simple reporting procedure. An individual or
office should be designated as the report recipient. Establishing
a special person for this purpose sends the message that the
125
organization takes the issues seriously and is open to dissent.
Having someone like an ombudsperson, independent of

Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 19, at 325.
118.
119.
Id. at 326.
120.
Markus & Kitayama, supra note 100, at 230 n.3; James W. Michaels &
Terance D. Miethe, Applying Theories of Deviance to Academic Cheating, 70 SOC. ScI.
Q. 870 (1989).
See generally Callahan et al., supra note 16.
121.
See, e.g., LUIS R. GOMEZ-MEIJIA ET AL., MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES 268122.
74 (2001) (providing ways to engage employees including workshops, live
presentations, and videos); Markus & Kitayama, supra note 100, at 231-32 (asserting
that whistleblowing is more likely to occur in Asian societies when there is a clear
definition of what is wrongful).
Janet P. Near & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Responses to Legislative
123.
Changes: Corporate Whistleblowing Policies, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 1551, 1558 (1998).
124.
Markus & Kitayama, supra note 100, at 228 (presenting evidence that
Asians are less likely to do a cost-benefit analysis and more likely to report for the good
of the group).
125.
Callahan & Dworkin, Media Whistleblowers, supra note 115, at 165-66.

476

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:457

management, reinforces this message. 126 It also increases the
1 27
likelihood of reporting and reduces the fear of retaliation.
. Investigate and respond quickly. To the extent possible, the

privacy of the parties involved should be maintained during the
investigation. The response should include a report back to the
whistleblower to demonstrate that the company has listened and
taken action.
. Maintain strong auditing. Someone high in the organization
or on the board, depending on how the reporting procedure is
established, should ensure that the system is working as planned
and that responses to reports are appropriate. 12 8 If patterns of
unwanted behavior emerge, this person should also ensure these
are addressed through further training or other action.
. Republish and report. An annual report should be issued to

all employees summarizing activities. 129 The report should come
This shows that the
from the head of the organization.
leadership believes the program is important, 130 reinforces the
message that dissent is allowed, and that management listens to
employees. It is also an opportunity to re-publish the policies
and bring them to employees' attention.
Many MNCs already have most of these policies in place because
they meet the requirements of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines
and other legal spurs.' 3 1 One of the main differences between these
suggestions and what many U.S. companies have established in
response to the Guidelines is the establishment of an ombudsperson
rather than a hotline. The former is preferred because it makes

126.
This is especially important when managers are involved in the
wrongdoing. Id. at 165.
127.
Callahan et al., supra note 16, at 24.
128.
HOFSTEDE, supra note 101, at 274-75 (noting the importance of feedback
channels in effectively managing multicultural organizations).
Hess & Dunfee, supra note 5, at 623-25 (regarding the importance of
129.
They state that this lends
companies reporting progress in fighting bribery).
credibility, and cite with favor the Global Reporting Initiative. Id. at 624 n.181. The
reporting must be done consistent with individual privacy concerns.
130.
The impression that top-level managers are exempt from the rules is the
most likely factor to undermine acceptance and observance of the rules. See Gary R.
Weaver & Linda Klebe Trevino, Compliance and Values Oriented Ethics Programs:
Influences on Employees' Attitudes and Behavior, 9 BUS. & ETHICS Q. 315, 323, 330;
Robert C. Ford & Woodrow D. Richardson, Ethical Decision Making: A Review of the
Empirical Literature,13 J. Bus. ETHICS 205, 212 (1994). Alternatively, strong support
from the top is likely to encourage reporting in Asian societies. The Chinese, for
example, emphasize being loyal and pious to their superiors and obey them, "whether
they are parents, employers, or government officials." Markus & Kitayama, supra note
100, at 233; see also HOFSTEDE, supra note 101, at 259.
131.
See supra notes 40-71 and accompanying text; see also Hess & Dunfee,
supra note 5, at 29-30 (recommending C2 Principles consistent with suggestions).
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investigation and follow-up reporting more feasible, and the personal
132
contact is important to foster compliance.
2. Appropriate Ethical Norms and Cultural Adaptability
People will not become whistleblowers if they do not consider the
observed activity wrongful, no matter how good the reporting
procedures may be. What is considered wrongful is affected by
culture. 133 Thus, the more globally an MNC's code is to be applied,
the more difficult it will be to have buy-in from all employees. To
foster participation, the code should concern relatively few issues that
can garner wide acceptance or understanding. Also, in order to make
it the most effective, allowance must be made for some cultural
adaptation. While this is not easy, it can be done.
The easiest norm for employees to understand is compliance with
the law. Other norms on which a company could get broad agreement
are fair treatment of employees, protection of the environment, and
rules against bribery. Within these broad categories, however, there
is much room for interpretation. The following discussion, which
focuses on harassment, serves as an example. Harassment is chosen
because it is almost universally banned or frowned upon in its most
egregious forms, legal rules regarding it have led many MNCs to
adopt codes and reporting procedures, it has distinctive cultural
interpretations, it involves ethical duties, and there is evidence of a
134
positive correlation between gender equality and nonviolence.
The recognition of sexual harassment as a legal and moral issue
is relatively recent. Even after the adoption of Title VII in the United
States in 1964, which laid the legal basis for equal gender treatment
in the U.S. workplace, harassment was not initially recognized as
falling within this law. It is only in the last two decades that
protection from harassment has become a widespread legal right in
the United States.13 5 Today, two forms of sexual harassment are
recognized by the courts: quid pro quo harassment and hostile
environment sexual harassment. A quid pro quo cause of action
arises when a supervisor offers or threatens to withhold a job or job
benefit in exchange for sexual favors. 136 Hostile environment cases

132.
Many hotlines allow anonymous reporting. MICELI & NEAR, supra note 19,
at 61, 74-75 (asserting that anonymity, while reducing chances of retaliation,
undermine credibility and effectiveness); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 9-YEAR

GAO FRAUD HOTLINE SUMMARY (1988); Callahan & Dworkin, Media Whistleblowing,
supra note 115, at 168-69.
See, e.g., HOFSTEDE, supra note 101, at 13-38; Markus & Kitayama, supra
133.
note 100, at 223-29.
134.
Fort & Schipani, supra note 3, at 434 n.256.
135.
See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (showing the
Supreme Court's first recognition of sexual harassment).
136.
The employer is strictly liable for such actions. See generally id.
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arise when unwelcome sexual conduct from any employee
unreasonably interferes with individual job performance, or creates
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. 3 7 The latter
is the type for which the Supreme Court recognized a defense if
and correct it, including
employers make reasonable efforts to prevent
38
effective policies and complaint procedures.'
Other countries and trade organizations have followed the
United States and recognized these forms of sexual harassment, and
often adopt the same language.' 3 9 However, cultural and legal
differences have resulted in the concept having different meanings
and results. The European Commission, for example, prepared a
Code of Practice that enunciated official recommendations on
workplace sexual harassment. 140 The Commission used the language
adopted in the United States to define both kinds of sexual
harassment, but the Code contained no sanctions and was nonbinding on Member States.' 4 ' This left the Member States to deal
with harassment in their own way. 142 France chose to distance itself
from the U.S. approach, dealing only with quid pro quo harassment,
but making it a crime. 143 Prosecution, however, is generally limited
to situations where the harassment was essentially equivalent to

137.
Id.
138.
See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
See generally Michael Starr, Who's the Boss? The Globalization of U.S.
139.
Employment Law, 51 BUS. LAW. 635 (1996); Beverly H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, An
InternationalPerspectiveon Sexual HarassmentLaw, 12 LAW & INEQ. 43 (1993).
In 1990, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution entitled, "The
140.
Protection of the Dignity of Men and Women at Work." The resolution defined sexual
harassment in the same terms as those used in the United States, and urged the
European Commission to prepare a Code of Practice. The Commission found that
sexual harassment was a serious problem for many working women after reviewing
research, and prepared the Code of Practice. See generally MICHAEL RUBENSTEIN,
HOW TO COMBAT SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT WORK: A GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION CODE OF PRACTICE (1993); MICHAEL RUBENSTEIN, THE
DIGNITY OF WOMEN AT WORK: A REPORT ON THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1987).
Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1227
141.
(1994). Bernstein posited that the lack of sanctions resulted from the fact that sexual
harassment was not widely viewed as a legal wrong in the EU Member States. Id.
142.
In response to a proposal from the European Commission (2000 O.J. (E
337) 196), the Council issued a decision on December 20, 2000, which established a
program for a Community framework strategy on gender equality. 2001 O.J. (L17/22)
19.1. It does not specifically mention sexual harassment.
Abigail C. Saguy, Employment Discriminationor Sexual Violence? Defining
143.
Sexual Harassment in American and French Law, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1091, 1092
(2000).
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some of the states adopted laws, but
sexual violence. 144 In Germany,
145
themselves.
among
they varied
Other countries demonstrate widely divergent attitudes toward
sexual harassment. In the Czech Republic, for example, many viewed
with disapproval what they saw as the extremes of U.S.
146
jurisprudence and the media attention paid to the issue.
Additionally, many women did not view the issue as one of individual
rights or one that required laws to protect them, 147 and many women
viewed verbal remarks favorably. 148 No laws addressed the issue and
Czech companies lacked policies pertaining to it. 149 Japan also had
no laws specifically pertaining to harassment and harassment was
dismissed as trivial by both companies and businessmen. 150
Nonetheless, a Japanese court in 1992 awarded damages to a
Japanese woman who was verbally harassed by her employer. 151
These are but a few examples of national differences toward
sexual harassment. Not only does this diversity present a challenge
to implementing global policies for MNCs, 152 it also leads to dilemmas
for many nationals working abroad. 15 3 One way to approach these

144.
Id. at 1098.
See, e.g., Monica Bhattacharyya, From Nondifferentiation to Factual
145.
Equality: Gender Equality Jurisprudence Under the German Basic Law, 21 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 915 (1996).
146.
Why Feminism is Doing Poorly in the Czech Republic, CTK NAT'L NEWS
WIRE, Mar. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CTK Nat'l News Wire File.
147.
Alex Friedrich, Harassment Allegations Seen as Czech Anomaly, PRAGUE
POST, July 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Prague Post File.
Id.; see also Emma McClune, Media Leads Dialogue About Whether Sexual
148.
HarassmentDoes Exist, PRAGUE POST, Aug. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Prague Post File (noting that some public officials were content with the "state of
sexual relations in the Czech Republic").
149.
See Friedrich, supra note 147.
Daniel Niven, The Case of the Hidden Harassment,HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.150.
Apr. 1992, at 12.
151.
Nancy Patterson, Recent Development, No More Naki-Neiri? The State of
Japanese Sexual Harassment Law: Judgment of April 16, 1992, Fukuoka Chiho
Saibansho, Heisei Gannen (1989) (wa) No. 1872, Songai Baisho Jiken (Japan), 34
HARV. INT'L L.J. 206 (1993).
In addition to the challenges already mentioned, MNCs face an ethical
152.
dilemma: Do MNCs have a moral obligation to enforce higher standards no matter
where they operate because of the physical and emotional costs of harassment and its
reinforcement of unequal treatment. See, e.g., Terry Morehead Dworkin et al., Theories
of Recovery for Sexual Harassment: Going Beyond Title VII, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125
(1988); Ben Bursten, Psychiatric Injury in Women's Workplaces, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 245 (1986); Peggy Crull, Stress Effects of Sexual Harassment on the
Job: Implicationsfor Counseling, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 539 (1982).
For example, if U.S. employees are part of a joint venture where they are
153.
working alongside employees of the host country, should they impose their values if
they see something that would clearly be wrong at home? Can they demand that they
be treated in a manner similar to what they would expect if working in their home
country? Alternatively, can they ignore the stricter home constraints if they are
working in a country that lacks them? See, e.g., Andrew B. Thorson, The 1953 United
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questions is through the perspective provided by Professors
Donaldson and Dunfee in their integrative social contracts theory,
which recognizes ethical obligations based on macrosocial and
microsocial contracts. 154 Companies can build on this to develop
ways to resolve ethical issues in a global context, using a generic
stakeholder theory that is not culturally bound. 155
Dunfee argues that hypernorms can be used to border or limit
If non-harassment is a
the cultural relativism of micronorms.
hypernorm, or if there are hypernorms limiting microsocial treatment
of harassment, then universal rules about harassment could be
ethically applied. A hypernorm is a principal "so fundamental to
human existence that [it serves] as a guide in evaluating lower level
moral norms. '156 Because of its importance, the hypernorm is likely
to be reflected in global principles that are generally recognized in a
variety of ways. Often hypernorms are cast in the language of rights.
This raises the question of whether there are hypernorms that
support a right to work in an environment free of harassment.
An examination of numerous global and regional declarations
and other documents, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 157 the UN Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 158 OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises,' 5 9 the Council of Europe's 1996 Social
Charter, 160 EC Directives and Codes of Practice, as well as the laws
and philosophies of particular countries, suggest there are three
hypernorms relevant to harassment: personal security, 16 1 respect for
human dignity, 162 and nondiscrimination. 16 3 At a minimum, these
hypernorms support global rules against quid pro quo harassment.

States Japan FCN Treaty: Can Title VII Protect American Women?, 3 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 315 (1993).
154.
Thomas Donaldson & Thomas R. Dunfee, Toward A Unified Conception of
Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252 (1994);
see also THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL
CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 49-81 (1999).
155.
Thomas R. Dunfee, Does Stakeholder Theory Make Sense In a Global
Context?, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Association of
Business and Society, Vienna (June 1995) (on file with Author).
Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 154, at 265.
156.
157.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th
plen. mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948). This document was part of the International
Bill of Human Rights. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/565 (1948).
158.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 19 I.L.M. 33 (opened for signature on March 1, 1980).
159.
Clarification on Environmental Concerns in OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, 25 I.L.M. 494 (1986).
160.
European Social Charter, Europ. T.S. No. 163, 36 I.L.M. 31 (1997).
W.C. Frederick, The Empirical Quest for Normative Meaning: Introduction
161.
and Overview, 2 Bus. ETHICS Q. 91 (1992).
162.
Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 154, at 267.
163.
THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 87 (1989).
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Being forced to trade sexual favors for the right to employment and
its benefits threatens personal security, undermines human dignity,
It is not
and is generally acknowledged to be discriminatory.
endorsed by any country.
Environmental sexual harassment is more problematic, since it
seldom involves personal security and there is no general consensuseven in the United States-as to what constitutes a harassing
environment. Staring, verbal comments, jokes, and the like are not
viewed as harassment of women in many countries. 164 To the extent
that such harassment erodes human dignity and is discriminatory, it
Thus, organizations can ban
violates two of the hypernorms.
demeaning and discriminatory treatment. What constitutes such
treatment, though, should be determined on a microsocial basis.
165
Cultural imperialism must also be avoided.
Part of the effective complaint procedure discussed above is
having a clearly-written compliance program, along with training.
66
This is where cultural differences should be taken into account.
Exploration of what constitutes a harassing environment in a
particular location should be addressed through seminars, focus
groups, and by other means. It is unrealistic to expect that the U.S.
standard for what constitutes a harassing environment would be
accepted elsewhere. However, respecting cultural differences does
not mean respecting the lowest common denominator. 167 A minimum
standard should be set, and the chance to appeal outside the local
system should be allowed. This appeal could be taken to the person
doing the auditing, who then would be responsible for ensuring that
local interpretations do not set the bar too low.
MNC implementation of global equal treatment standards that
are reinforced by reporting procedures is not only feasible, but can
help reduce conflict. Some studies indicate there is a positive
correlation between gender equality and nonviolence. 168 Creating an
atmosphere where inter-group interactions are fostered under
conditions of equal treatment helps reduce conflict. 169 It can help

164.
See, e.g., Sandra Orihuela & Abigail Montjoy, The Education of Latin
America's Sexual Harassment Law: A Look at Mini-Skirts and Multinationals in Peru,
30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 323 (2000).
Richard T. DeGeorge, International Business Ethics, 4 Bus. ETHICS Q. 1
165.
(1994); Derek G. Barella, Note, Checking the "Trigger-Happy" Congress: The
ExtraterritorialExtension of Federal Employment Laws Requires Prudence, 69 IND.
L.J. 889, 913 (1994). Cf. Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481 (1985) (arguing that contractarianism
and other business ethics arguments have a Western bias).
HOFSTEDE, supra note 101, at 276.
166.
167.
Nichols, supra note 1, at 299. Donaldson and Dunfee suggest that a
prioritization rule can help resolve norm conflicts, but that it must be tested against
universal principles. DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 154, at 185-86, 226-30.
Fort & Schipani, supra note 3, at 434.
168.
See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
169.
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defuse resentment and limit disruptive behavior by contributing to171a
feeling of psychological security1 70 and increased physical security.
172
A similar analysis could be conducted regarding bribery.
Professors Salbu and Nichols, in their recent articles debating the
wisdom of attempting to control bribery through implementation of
global laws, illustrate the cultural variations in interpreting what
constitutes bribery. 73 Professor Salbu notes that without true global
unity, respect must be paid to cultural diversity.' 74 He states that
the world today is culturally pluralistic, and argues against a forced
fit between externally imposed law and divergent cultures. 75 In
furthering this argument, Salbu illustrates the cultural variations in
the views of gifts versus bribes. Professor Nichols focuses on the
harm bribery causes, including loss of respect for the law, inequitable
distribution of wealth that further adds to social tension,
undermining democracy, and possibly leading to coups, 1 76 and loss of

peace. 177 He believes it is possible to ban transnational bribery.
Despite the lack of uniformity, it is feasible for an MNC to ban
bribery.
Every country in the world prohibits bribery of its
officials.' 78 This would be the starting point of such a code,' 79 along
with compliance with local laws. However, allowance for legitimate

170.
Fort & Schipani, supra note 3, at 432.
171.
MICELI & NEAR, supra note 19, at 11.
172.
Professor Dunfee has recently argued for the control of bribery through
corporate action. Hess & Dunfee, supra note 5, at 594.

173.

Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature

Evocation of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 226 (1999); see also
Nichols, supra note 1, at 279.
Salbu, supra note 173, at 226.
174.
175.
Id. at 230-31.
•176.
Hess & Dunfee, supra note 5, at 596. "Corruption limits a government's
ability to perform vital functions and may even threaten its overall effectiveness." Id.
177.
Nichols, supra note 1, at 279. "The ability of law enforcers to dispense with
the law and of bribe-givers to buy their way around the law renders the system
meaningless . . . . Ultimately, bribery undermines the legitimacy of governments,
Citizens may come to believe that government is simply
especially democracies ....
for sale to the highest bidder." Id.; see also Timothy L. Fort & James J. Noone, Gifts,

Bribes and Exchange: Relationships in Non-Market Economies and Lessons for Pax ECommercia, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 515, 520 (2000) (noting how bribery may lead to
"even possible revolution").
Hess and Dunfee note that bribery can influence
government spending by moving it out of vital functions to areas where the bribetakers can earn more. Hess & Dunfee, supra note 5, at 597.
178.
Nichols, supra note 1, at 258, 278. It is also condemned by the world's
major faiths. Hess & Dunfee, supra note 5, at 594.
179.
Professors Donaldson and Dunfee establish a series of hypernorms against
bribery including "necessary social efficiency" in their book. DONALDSON & DUNFEE,
supra note 154, at 117. Necessary social efficiency bears some resemblance to
Professor Patricia Werhane's "basic rights." Id.
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gift-giving can be made on a microsocial basis with appropriate
discussion and training. 80
As stated in the introduction, bribery can cause conflict. One
important reason is that it undermines free trade, and free trade
helps foster peace. 18 ' Corporations that adopt bribery bans and
enforce them through reporting procedures potentially contribute to
peace by allowing better utilization of resources.18 2 This, in turn,
frees up more resources for those at the bottom of the economic
rungs, 8 3 and will have an increased impact in the emerging
economies that are most harmed by bribery.1 8 4 Current writers on
bribery all stress the need for transparency. 8 5 Rules reinforced by
whistleblowing can help to deliver transparency.

IV. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF OPEN REPORTING AND COMMUNICATION TO
THE CORPORATION AND TO PEACE

Discussions
of
bribery
and
harassment
contemplate
consideration of local norms in order to be effective. The interaction
between rules and local norms is best explained through small-group
training and discussions.
Imposition of rules without an
86
understanding of the rationale behind them is not very effective.'
Local, small-group discussions allow explanations in culturally-

180.
Hess & Dunfee, supra note 5, at 605 (noting that the International
Chamber of Commerce's (ICC) recommendation that businesses adopt their own rules
of conduct based on the ICC's bribery rules, but adapted to their particular situations).
181.
Fort & Noone, supranote 177, at 517.
182.
Nichols states that bribery could be globally banned by making it a crime
when it is prohibited by the laws of the host country. Nichols, supra note 1, at 288.
183.
Fort & Noone, supra note 177, at 521; DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note
154, at 228.
184.
See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
185.
Nichols, for example, states that effective policing will require transparent
decisionmaking in host countries and voluntary codes of corporate conduct. Nichols,
supra note 1, at 259. These are precisely the processes that whistleblowing promotes.
Opaque regulatory procedures, when combined with weak enforcement, create
conditions which help promote bribery. Id. at 273; see also Hess & Dunfee, supra note
5, at 605 (noting international attempts to create more transparent regulatory
procedures); Fort & Noone, supra note 177, at 542 (discussing mediating institutions
that may reduce bribery).
186.
See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 41 (1881).
"The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the
actual feelings and demands of the community .... " Id.; Fort & Noone, supra note
177, at 528. The more culturally diverse the organization, the more difficult it is to
achieve "major learning" or to change norms, values, and worldviews. Arvind Parkhe,
Interfirm Diversity, Organizational Learning, and Longevity in Global Strategic
Alliances, 22 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 579, 591 (1991).
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is usually

desired norms

an

can be

accomplished on a group basis. Understanding of the norms should

lessen misunderstandings and unintentional false alarms.
Additionally, feeling that one can make an impact at the local level
makes one more likely to adopt community norms.18 8 To the extent
that the rules have personal meaning, they are more likely to be
followed.1 8 9 Professors Fort and Noone urge this approach in
combating bribery. 190 Many Australian companies train against
sexual harassment by having male employees, in small groups,
visualize the acts of harassment happening to their wives, daughters,
and mothers. 191 Engagement fosters absorption and understanding,
and engagement is easiest in small numbers where personal
interaction is facilitated.
Internal whistleblowing procedures and codes of ethics will
operate more effectively when organizations operate as mediating
Mediating institutions are relatively small
institutions. 192
193
organizations where moral identity and behavior is formed.
Studies indicate that as the size of an organization increases,
individual ethical decision-making behavior decreases.' 94 Thus, for
large multinational corporations, the need for training in relatively
small groups at the local level is heightened. To the extent that
corporate employees cooperate with one another, it may be because
19 5
they have internalized trust learned within the organization.
Again, this is easier learned through face-to-face, personal
interaction.
There are benefits to the organization that adopts these policies
Global strategic alliances represent a type of
and procedures.
competitive weapon. In order to take the best advantage of the

187.
Fort & Noone, supra note 177, at 536. The relative size the categories the
labor force is broken down into, and work structuring and coordination varies by
culture. HOFSTEDE, supra note 101, at 265.
188.
Fort & Noone, supra note 177, at 544.
189.
See, e.g,, David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1811 (2001).
190.
Fort & Noone, supra note 177, at 543-46.
191.
Geoffrey Glaser, Sexes See Harassing Differently (April 1996), at
"M/W/D"
(noting the
use
of
the
http://www.hrstore.com/free/free40f.html
(Mother/Wife/Daughter) test to train employees).
192.

Callahan et al., supra note 16, at 17; HOFSTEDE, supra note 101, at 274

(noting that "[a] shared company subculture between people of otherwise different
national cultures considerably facilitates communication and motivation.").
193.
See TIMOTHY L. FORT, ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE: BUSINESS AS MEDIATING
INSTITUTION (2001).

194.
Robert C. Ford & Woodrow D. Richardson, Ethical Decision Making: A
Review of the EmpiricalLiterature,13 J. BUS. ETHICS 205, 217 (1994).
195.
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundatiotsof Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1738 (2001).
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alliance, organizations must listen to multicultural perspectives. 1 96
197
Additionally, firm-specific fairness norms promote efficiency.
Organizations that foster internal reporting and open discussion
are likely to find that external reporting will be virtually
nonexistent. 198
Problems can be raised and resolved earlier if
employees feel free to engage in discussion and dissent. Open
communication
within the
organization
has many other
organizational benefits as well 199

IV.

CONCLUSION

Stakeholders have the ability to wreak "fatal havoc" in business
and the world. 200 This is true of internal stakeholders-employeesas well as external stakeholders, especially with the increased
reliance on computers and information. 2 0 1 Failure to listen to
employees and deal fairly with them can provide conditions that
foster disruption and possible havoc. We saw the ability of a few
individuals to create debilitating and tragic havoc outside their
organizations on September 11.
"Corruption and unethical practices in the workplace are . . .
thought to result in declining confidence in major institutions and to
contribute to the alienation and anomie experienced in modern
society."20 2 MNCs that foster reasonable codes and meaningful
reporting procedures can help to defuse disruptive situations.
Combining whistleblowing and reporter protection with a code
significantly aids in several ways: it shows the company means what
it says, it gives employees a way to make sure the organization is
legal and ethical, it shows that open communication will be practiced,
20 3
and it shows that people who speak up will be dealt with fairly.

196.
Parkhe, supra note 186, at 598. Parkhe notes that this may be particularly
difficult for Japanese companies because of the historically closed nature of Japanese
society. Id.
197.
Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character,and Efficiency
in Firns, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717 (2001).
198.
Callahan et al., supra note 16, at 33.
199.
For example, to the extent that fairness norms are internalized, efficiency
is bolstered. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 197, at 1717-18. Externally, companies
that are seen as weak on transparency may be susceptible to public disapproval. Hess
& Dunfee, supra note 5, at 607.
200.
Fort, supra note 2, at 309; Pike, supra note 16.
201.
Fort, supra note 2, at 309-10.
202.
Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 19, at 322.
203.
Fort, supra note 2, at 336. "[T]he very commitment to communicate is a
validation of human respect and dignity." Fort cites Lon Fuller as one who argued for
communication as the central natural law principle. Id. at 359.
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20 4
MNCs can help in the evolution of a normative global village.
They can create conditions that socialize and empower individuals 20 5

and give them the tools to interact more successfully in their
society. 206
To the extent that ideas such as fairness and
responsibility for compliance are learned within the company and are
then taken externally, organizations have the ability to have an
impact far beyond their individual realm. 20 7 At the same time,
exporting the idea of whistleblowing helps promote transparency and
good government in larger society. 208 Organizational norms matter
20 9
most when law is the weakest.
As countries shift in their commercial institutions from a
"relational orientation" to a more Western "formal orientation" based
on the rule of law, 2 10 whistleblowing can be a helpful procedure in the
transition.2 11 It is designed to allow individuals to enforce the rules
despite the individual connections of those in power. In the words of
Alan Watson, "[i]n most places, at most times, borrowing is the most
fruitful source of legal change. '212 Borrowing from the MNCs who set
the bar higher can also be a fruitful source of change.

204.
"Individual firm action is a vital component of the ultimate mix of policies
and strategies that are likely to make a significant difference in the practice of corrupt
payments." Hess & Dunfee, supra note 5, at 615.
205.
Fort, supra note 2, at 331. In addition, the emergence of an informationbased society can lead to increased power for individuals vis-A-vis the government.
Stoltenberg, supra note 15, at 712-13.
206.
Fort, supra note 2, at 331.
207.
Id. at 332. Mediating institutions can promote peace by "humanizing the
relationships that exist within an organization." Id.
208.
Giving people a say in the organization's behavior reinforces democratic
ideas. Fort & Schipani, supra note 3, at 436.
209.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 2151, 2175 (2001).
210.
Nichols, supranote 1, at 281.
211.
Stoltenberg, supra note 15, at 725 (noting that "the strong capitalist
economy that has emerged recently in South Korea is contributing to the development
of an ethical decision pattern similar to that of the Western countries ....")(quoting
John M. Etheredge & Carolyn B. Erdener, Ethical Decision Patternsin Four Countries:
Contrasting Theoretical Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS:
CHALLENGES AND APPROACHES 61 (George Enderle ed., 1999)).
212.
Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335 (1996).

